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Justice Sonia Sotomayor's confirmation hearing took a controversial
turn when commentators became aware of a reference in the New York
Times to a portion of a speech she gave in 2001.1 In that speech, she
candidly addressed how her background might influence her decision
making opining, "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness
of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion
than a white male who hasn't lived that life." 2 Eight years later a minor
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presentation delivered at DRI's Diversity for Success Seminar. I am grateful to my co-panelists, Judge
Bernice Donald, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Judge Zeke Zeidler, Los
Angeles County Superior Court, for earlier comments on this article as well as discussion during the
panel presentation. In addition, thanks go to my colleagues, Professors Adjoa Aiyetoro and Kelly Terry,
for their comments on this article, to Professor of Law Librarianship Kathryn Fitzhugh for research
support, and former law student Amber Davis-Tanner for her helpful research assistance. Finally, this
essay was written with the support of a research grant from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law.
1 Charlie Savage, A Judge's View of Judging Is on Record, N.Y TIMES, May 15, 2009, at AG 21,
available at http://www.nytines.com/2009/05/15/us/15judge.html; see also Stuart Taylor, Identity
Politics & Sotomayor, NAT'L J., May 23, 2009, at 19. According to news reports, Justice Sotomayor
had repeated these words on several occasions. See Writings Reveal Sotomayor's Controversial 'Wise
Latina' Remark Not Isolated, FOX NEWS (June 4, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/04/writings-reveal-sotomayors-controversial-wise-latina-
remark-isolated/.
2 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).
Throughout this article, I sometimes use the terms "Latina," "Hispanic" and "Latina/o." I use the term
"Latina" with respect to Justice Sotomayor because that is how she speaks of herself. I use the term
"Hispanic" mostly with references to studies that use that term. In addition, the U.S. Census Bureau
uses the terms "Hispanic or Latino," so where I reference Census data, that term is generally used. See
State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html
(last modified Oct. 13, 2011). These terms, however, are not without political and ethnic significance,
and indeed are controversial. See Naomi Mezey, Erasure & Recognition: The Census, Race and the
National Imagination, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1701, 1744-49 (2003); see generally Gustavo Chacon
Mendoza, Gateway to Whiteness: Using the Census to Redefine and Reconfigure Hispanic/Latino
Identity, In Efforts to Preserve a White American National Identity, 30 U. LA. VERNE L. REv. 160
(2008) (discussing the status of the racial identity of Hispanic individuals in the United States).
105
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER
storm ensued as a result of that comment as well as the per curiam decision
in Ricci v. DeStefano, in which Justice Sotomayor participated as a judge
on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.4 More recently, former Harvard
Dean and former Solicitor General Elena Kagan came under fire during her
Supreme Court confirmation hearings for supporting her faculty's position
on the military's treatment of gay, lesbian, and bisexual lawyers and her
opposition to "don't ask/don't tell."5 This led some conservative
commentators to speculate that she is a lesbian. 6 Both Justice Sotomayor
and newly confirmed Justice Kagan were attacked for bringing a
perspective to the bench that supported minority groups - whether it be
Latinas, women, or the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered
communities. Yet, having judges who understand these perspectives would
no doubt add diversity to the bench.
While commentators and legal organizations have discussed the
importance of diversity in the legal profession and on the bench,7 the
treatment of these two Supreme Court nominees leads one to wonder
whether those in public office are really interested in adding diversity to the
bench. Could it be, instead, that it is only acceptable for a judicial candidate
to be "diverse" or have sympathy for minority communities so long as he
or she does not act on those sympathies? The brouhaha that both Justice
Sotomayor's comment engendered and Justice Kagan's position created
makes one question to what extent public officials are committed to
protecting minority groups by adding diversity to the bench.
Ranging from arguments about equal opportunity to the importance of
diversity in representing clients effectively, many large legal employers
actively seek out diverse lawyers to staff their firms.8 While the American
Bar Association and other organizations have addressed diversity in legal
practice, 9 others have focused on diversity on the bench.10 In particular,
530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008).
See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006), afj'd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d.
Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court decision in favor of a city who wished to discard the results of a
recent firefighter promotion test when no Black examinees qualified for promotion).
' See infra notes 242 to 257 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 265 and 270 and accompanying text.
7 See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models & Public Confidence,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 417 (2000) ("[TJhe inclusion of multiple perspectives in judicial
decision-making is a critical focus of diversity."); Angela Brouse, The Latest Call for Diversity in Law
Firms: Is it Legal?, 75 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848-50 (2006) (describing calls for diversity from
corporate counsel offices); AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, DIVERSITY IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS (April 2010) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL
DIVERSITY INITIATIVE]. The American Bar Association has a Commission on Racial and Ethnic
Diversity in the Profession and a Minority Counsel Program to promote the hiring of racially and
ethnically diverse lawyers. See Minority Counsel Program, AM. BAR ASS'N (2010),
http://new.abanet.org/centers/diversity/Pages/MinorityCounselProgram.aspx.
8 See Brouse, supra note 7, at 850-52.
9 See AM. BAR ASS'N, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, supra note 7; About Us, LEADERSHIP
COuNCIL ON LEGAL DIVERSITY, http://www.lcidnet.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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political scientists and increasingly law professors have looked at the
demographics of the judiciary, as well as the potential effects that diversity
might have on the administration of justice and the perceived and
sometimes actual fairness in case outcomes.I1 Political scientists who study
federal judicial appointments refer to judges who are women and people of
color as "nontraditional" appointees, 12 a term that will be used in this
article to refer to women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups.
Of course, diversity encompasses more than gender, race, and ethnicity.
Sexual orientation, disability, socio-economic status, religion and other
personal characteristics or life experiences also inform individual
viewpoints and could be characteristics policymakers might consider in
diversifying the bench.
This article discusses four main subjects. First, it begins by describing
the demographics of the federal judiciary and compares those
demographics to relevant population data. Included is a discussion of the
common career tracks for nontraditional federal judges. Second, it
canvasses some common arguments for a diverse bench and places the
controversy over the nominations of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan
within the overall discussion about the benefits of diversity on the bench.
Third, it describes studies that seek to determine whether the backgrounds
of judges, such as their gender, race, or ethnicity, correlate with differences
in decision making trends. Anecdotal evidence of differences in case
outcomes that correlate to differences in personal perspective will also be
addressed. This section discusses the practical implications of a diverse
bench not only on case outcomes but also on court policies. Finally, this
article will discuss the public commentary and questioning by the Senate
Judiciary Committee members about Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina
woman" comment, the Ricci case, and Justice Kagan's position on "don't
ask/don't tell" in an effort to fully understand the controversies that arose
in those hearings and the implications for achieving a truly diverse bench.
In the end, the statements and positions that provided negative fodder for
those who opposed the appointment of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan
ironically reflect just the types of perspectives that one would want from a
1o See Diversity on the Bench, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/diversity on-the bench (last visited Oct. 4,
2010).
" See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for
Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 5 (2004) ("[A] judge's racial background
shapes her world view and almost inevitably influences her judicial decision-making."); Leesa M.
Klepper, Gender Diversity in the Federal Judiciary: The Impact of President Bush's First Term, 52
FED. LAW 20 (July 2005); see generally Rorie L. Spill Solberg & Kathleen A. Bratton, Diversifying the
Federal Bench: Presidential Patterns, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 119 (2005) (analyzing the prevalence and
potential effects of diversity on the bench).
12 Sheldon Goldman, Sara Schiavoni & Elliot Slotnick, W. Bush's Judicial Legacy: Mission
Accomplished, 92 JUDICATURE 258, 259 (2009) [hereinafter Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W Bush's
Judicial Legacy].
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diverse bench. Thus, there is a disconnect between the public discourse on
individual nominees and the commentary regarding the benefits of diversity
in the judiciary.
II. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE FEDERAL BENCHI 3
The federal bench is not particularly diverse.14 This is in spite of the
strides women and minority groups have made in law school attendance.15
The numbers of members of racial and ethnic minority groups in law
school have increased.16 Although such improvements have not been
steady for certain groups,' 7 overall, minority enrollment has steadily
increased from a low of 6.1% in the 1971-72 school year to 22.4% in the
2009-10 school year.' 8 When I graduated from law school in 1989, women
made up roughly 42% of law students, and the number of women enrolled
in law school topped 50% during the 1992-93 school year but has not done
so since.19 Yet, over twenty years later, women's and racial and ethnic
minority groups' presence as law firm partners, law school professors, and
members of the federal bench lag behind that of their White male
1 At the time this article was written, there was little information available about President
Obama's appointees. Recently, however, information about his appointees suggests that they are the
most diverse group of judges appointed. During his first two years in office, 70.5% of his appointees
were nontraditional judges. Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama 's Judiciary at
Midterm, 94 JUDICATURE 262, 288 (2011) [hereinafter Goldman, Slotnick & Schiavoni, Obama's
Judiciary at Midterm]. Women, in particular, made up more than half of his appointees. See id.
However, even with Obama's appointees added, the gains for women were modest. See id at 289 tbl. 1.
Further discussion regarding the impact of President Obama's appointees will have to await another
article.
14 See infra Table 1.
1s Law School Enrollment Edges Upward, Minorities Show Slight Gain, Women Slight Drop, AM.
BAR Ass'N NEWS RELEASE (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news release.cfin?releaseid=87 (finding that just
under half of law school enrollees were women and just over 20% were minorities in 2006).
16 Id.
"7 From 1993 to 2008, both the percent and total number of African-American and Mexican-
American law students has declined. Tamar Lewin, Law School Admissions Lag Among Minorities,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A 22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/education/07law.html. The number of persons of American Indian
or Alaskan Native background who were enrolled in law school has also fluctuated a bit hitting a high
in 2009-10 of 1,273, but only after dipping down into the 900s during 1999-2002. American Indian or
Alaska Native JD. Enrollment 1971-2009, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%201 1.pdf (last visited October 25, 2011). For
information on how institutional racism affects the admissions of racial and ethnic minorities to law
school, see Vernellia R. Randall, The Misuse of the LSAT: Discrimination Against Blacks & Other
Minorities in Law School Admissions, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 107 (2006).
" First Year JD. & Total J.D. Minority Enrollment, 1971-2010, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-208.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
19 First Year & Total J.D. Enrollment by Gender 1947-2008, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legaled/statistics/charts/stats_1 9.authcheckdam.
pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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counterparts. 20 A sketch of the demographics of the federal bench provides
a sense of just how much.
Over the past thirty years, various presidents have made an effort to
diversify the federal bench. Some efforts have been more successful than
others, with promising results. By January 1, 2009, the end of President
George W. Bush's administration, 25% of United States District Court
judges were women and 26.9% of the United States Court of Appeals
judges were women.21 At that point, however, there was only one sitting
United States Supreme Court justice who was a woman-Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. That number doubled with the appointment of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor by President Barack Obama, and the Court is now one-third
female after the confirmation of Justice Elena Kagan. 22 A recent study by
the Center for Women in Government & Civil Society at SUNY Albany
placed the percentage of women in the federal judiciary at 22%-somewhat
lower than the percentage on January 1, 2009.23 In terms of racial and
ethnic diversity, as of January 1, 2009, 11.4% of United States District
Court judges were African American and 8.3% of United States Court of
Appeals judges were African American.24 The percentage of Hispanic
judges sitting on both the United States District Courts and United States
Court of Appeals was 7.2%.25 There were only eight Asian American
judges sitting on a United States District Court - a total of 1.2% of sitting
district court judges. 26 At the end of the Bush administration, there were no
Asian American judges in active service sitting on a United States Courts
of Appeals. 27
While there are obviously state to state demographic differences, it is
useful to think of this data in terms of the overall population of the United
States. According to United States Census Bureau estimates from 2010,
63.7% of the United States population are White not of Hispanic origin
20 See, e.g., Brouse, supra note 7, at 847-48 (detailing the legal profession's failure to diversify);
Marjorie E. Komhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupational Segregation by
Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293 (2004). Data collected by the National
Association for Law Placement ("NALP") shows that in 2009, 19.21% of law firms partners were
women, 6.05% were members of minority groups, and 1.88% were minority women. Law Firm
Diversity Demographics Show Little Change, Despite Economic Downturn, NALP, (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.nalp.org/oct09lawfirmdiversity. In the associate ranks, 45.66% were women, 19.67% were
members of minority groups, and 11.02% were minority women. Id.
2' Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W. Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 276 tbl.l.
22 See Kathy Kiely, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan to Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-08-05-kagan-supreme-court-
confirmation N.htm.
23 CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIVIL Soc'Y, ROCKEFELLER COLL. OF PUB. AFFAIRS & POLICY,
UNIV. AT ALBANY, STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK, WOMEN IN FEDERAL & STATE-LEVEL JUDGESHIPS I
(Spring 2010), available at http://www.albany.edu/womeningov/judgeships-report final web.pdf.
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(although overall 72.4% are classified as White), 12.6% are African
American, .9% are American Indian or Alaskan Natives, 4.8% are Asian,
0.2% are Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and 16.3% are of
Hispanic or Latino origin. 28 In addition, women make up 50.8% of the
United States population. 29 Thus, comparing percentages of judges in the
various demographic categories that implicate diversity reveals a
discrepancy between the percentage of certain groups in the population and
their percent representation on the federal bench. As Table 1 below reveals,
in both the district courts and courts of appeals, women and members of
ethnic minority groups are under-represented based on their numbers in the
overall United States population.
Table 1
Percentage of Federal Judges Compared to General Population Data30
Group U.S. Census District Courts Appellate
Data Courts
White(non- 63.7% 80.2% 84.5%
Hispanic)
African 12.6% 11.4% 8.3%
American
Native 0.9% 0% 0%
American
Asian 4.8% 1.2% 0%
Latino/a 16.3% 7.2% 7.2%
Women 50.8% 25% 27%
In addition, in certain jurisdictions, the discrepancy is more glaring. For
example, in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh and
District of Columbia federal district courts, the percentage of African
American judges is less than the general population of African Americans
in those jurisdictions. 31 The largest discrepancy is in the District of
28 State & County Quick Facts 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU].
29 id
30 Derived from data in Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W. Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12,
at 276 tbl.1 and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 28. This data is current as of 2010. There was some
discrepancy between Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick's demographic designations and that of the U.S.
Census Bureau. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau groups American Indians and Alaskan Natives
together. Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick's category designation was "Native American." I am
uncertain whether these differing designations include the same groups, and am assuming so for
purposes of this table. In addition, the Census refers to Hispanic or Latino origin, whereas Goldman,
Schiavoni & Slotnick refers to Hispanic. I have grouped this in table I as "Latino/a."
31 Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W. Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 277 tbl.2.
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Columbia district courts, where 55.2% of the general population is African
American, and only 33.3% (one third) of the district court judges are
African American.32 Some jurisdictions (specifically the Third, Eighth,
Ninth and Tenth) have an "over-representation" of African American
district court judges based on a comparison to general population data,
although it is not by a large margin. 33 For example, the jurisdiction with
largest "overrepresentation" is the Eighth Circuit District Court bench, in
which 7.6% of the population is African American and 15.8% of the active
district court judges are African American.34
In no jurisdiction are Hispanic district court judges "overrepresented" in
light of their percentage in the general population.35 In every jurisdiction
except the District of Columbia district courts (where the number of
Hispanic federal district court judges mirrors the general population -
8.3%), the percentage of Hispanic district court judges is less than than the
percentage of Hispanic persons present in the general population. 36 In three
jurisdictions - the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits - there are no sitting
federal district court judges who are Hispanic Americans. 37 In some
jurisdictions, the difference is substantial.38 For example, in the Second
Circuit, 15.3% of the population is Hispanic American, yet only 3.3% of
federal district court judges are Hispanic American.39 Similarly, in the
Ninth Circuit, 28.4% of the general population is Hispanic American; yet,
only 9.4% of federal district court judges are Hispanic American. 40 Finally,
in the Fifth Circuit, with a general population that is 28.3% Hispanic
American, only 15.2% of the federal district court judges are Hispanic
American.41
The discrepancies with respect to women are also significant. While
2010 U.S. Census Bureau estimates project that women make up nearly
51% of the United States population,42 in five jurisdictions they are less
than 25% of the sitting federal district court judges.43 The Fourth Circuit
has the fewest women sitting in federal trial courts - only 16% of its judges
are female. 44 The largest percentage of women federal district court judges











42 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 28.
43 Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W. Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 277 tbl.2.
44Id.
No. 2/3] Ill
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER
judges are women.45 According to the study by the Center for Women in
Government & Civil Society at SUNY Albany, there are only three states
where women make up 30% or more of the federal judiciary. 46 Finally, the
dearth of women sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals - there is
and only ever has been one - has led to a movement to increase the number
of women sitting on that court.47
Some might argue that comparisons to the general population are not
appropriate, because the population of those who are lawyers is
considerably different. While the population of lawyers would be the
appropriate comparison group for matters such as an employment
discrimination case involving lawyers, 48 this is not necessarily the best
comparison in terms of assessing diversity on the bench because the
number of lawyers in the United States from any group is much greater
than the total number of judgeships. For example, there are only nine
United States Supreme Court Justices, 179 federal court of appeals judges,
677 federal district court judges, and nine judges of the Court of
International Trade, for a total of 875 Article III judges.49 Thus, for any
given judicial opening, there are more than enough qualified persons of
diverse backgrounds from which to choose. Take, for example, the Eastern
District of Arkansas, which has had two openings recent years. 50 For each
position, Arkansas's Senators suggested three candidates. 51 Thus, while
African American or women lawyers may be fewer in number in the
lawyer population in Arkansas than their White male counterparts, there are
more than enough qualified women and African American lawyers from
whom to choose for these two positions. Surely there are six well-qualified
women or members of racial or ethnic minority groups that could be
45 id
46 See CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIVIL SoC'Y, supra note 23, at 8. Those states are Minnesota,
Connecticut, and New Jersey. See id.
47 See Sally J. Kenney, Infinity Project Seeks to Increase Gender Diversity of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 92 JUDICATURE 131, 131-32 (2008). The study by the Center for Women in
Government & Civil Society at SUNY Albany placed the overall percentage of women on the state
bench at 26%. CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIvIL Soc'Y, supra note 23, at 1. In addition, that study
noted that in only fifteen states did women made up more than 30% of the state judiciary, and in no
state did they make up 50% of the judiciary. Id. at 10. As to state courts of last resort, only 10.3% of
those judges are members of racial or ethnic minority groups. Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson &
Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial & Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES' J. 31
tbl.2 (2009), available at http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/pdf/ReddickNelsonCaufield.pdf At the
intermediate appellate court level, 12.6% of judges are members of racial and ethnic minority groups.
Id. Finally, of judges sitting on general jurisdiction trial courts, 11.1% are members of racial or ethnic
minority groups. Id.
48 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977).
49 US. Courts Federal Judgeships, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ON BEHALF OF THE FED.
JUDICIARY, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Oct.
23, 2011).
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considered. Importantly, the demographics of the lawyer population are
less likely to reflect the demographics of the litigants who are likely to
appear in front of these judges than the general population data. As is
explained below, who appears in front of judges and the fairness these
litigants perceive are very important aspects of having a diverse bench.52
That said, a look at lawyer demographics still might tell something
about the discrepancies. Examining the statistics on lawyers in the United
States, 31% of lawyers are women.53 The Department of Labor's 2010
statistics places the number of women at 31.5% of lawyers in the United
States. 54 In addition, nationally, women make up 48% of law school
graduates and 45% of law firm associates. 55 The latest study of the federal
bench places the percentage of federal judges who are female at 22%.56
Thus, even this number does not reflect the percentage of women in the
lawyer population, let alone in the general population. In addition, as
explained above, there are glaring exceptions in specific jurisdictions
where there are very few women judges. For example, as of January 1,
2009, in the Northern District of New York, there were no federal district
court judges or magistrates who were female despite a large population of
state court female judges. 57 In addition, in Arkansas, women make up only
15% of the federal judiciary.58 Thus, some districts have far fewer female
judges on the bench than even the low national average.
According to the Department of Labor's 2010 statistics, among
lawyers, 4.3% are African American, 3.4% are Asian, and 3.4% are
Hispanic or Latino. 59 The data shows that Asian Americans are also under-
represented in federal court judgeships. 60 In addition, the National
Association for Law Placement has been collecting data on the number of
LGBT attorneys in practice since 2003.61 According to its latest data,
52 See infra notes 77 to 79 and accompanying text.
5 A Current Glance at Women in the Law 2009, AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/women/reports/CurrentGlanceStatistics
2 0 0 9 .aut
hcheckdam.pdf.
54 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES
15 (2009), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2010.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS].
5 CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIvIL SOC'Y, supra note 23, at 12.
56 Id. at 1. This disparity may be because President George W. Bush appointed fewer women than
President Clinton. See Kenney, supra note 47, at 131 (noting that 30% of President Clinton's appeals
court appointments were women, whereas only 20% of President Bush's appeals court appointments
were women).
5 See CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOV'T & CIVIL SoC'Y, supra note 23, at 12.
5 Id. at 2.
5 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 54.
60 Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 276 tbl. I (finding
that Asian-Americans make up only 1% of federal judges).
0' Although Most Firms Collect LGBT Lawyer Information, Overall Numbers Remain Low, NALP
(Dec. 2009), http: //www.nalp.org/dec09glbt.
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LGBT lawyers make up 1.82% of the lawyers in the firms they surveyed.62
Yet, there is only one openly LGBT federal judges, and he was recently
appointed.63 Thus, there are discrepancies with respect to some groups
even when comparing to the lawyer population.
Another statistic worth noting about nontraditional, federal judicial
appointees is differences in career track between these appointees and
"traditional" appointees, i.e., White males. The typical career track for
nontraditional appointees is through lower level positions within the
judiciary. For example, during his first six years in office, 85.7% of
President George W. Bush's nontraditional appointees to the United States
Appeals Courts had judicial experience - whether in state court or some
other federal court.64 Only 47.4% of his traditional appointees, on the other
hand, had prior judicial experience.6 s In addition, many nontraditional
appointees to the United States Appeals Courts had prosecutorial
experience - 33.3% of those appointed.66 While 34.2% of President George
W. Bush's United States Appeals Court traditional appointees had
prosecutorial experience as well, only 4.8% of his nontraditional appointees
had neither prosecutorial nor judicial experience. 67 Yet, 36.8% of his
traditional appointees did not have experience as a prosecutor or judge.68
The discrepancy in career track for traditional and nontraditional
appointees is similar for President George W. Bush's district court
appointees. Once again, judicial or prosecutorial experience appears to be
the norm among nontraditional appointees, with only 11.8% of them
having neither experience. 69 The majority of nontraditional appointees-
72.9%-had prior judicial experience. 70 The percentage of his traditional
appointees with prior judicial experience was only 42.0%.71 This has led
some commentators to posit that we might be seeing a trend toward a
career judicial track much like that present in civil law countries.72 Bush's
nontraditional district court appointees typically had more prosecutorial
experience than Bush's federal appellate court appointees. 73 A majority of
his nontraditional district court appointees had prosecutorial experience -
62 Id
63 Alana Horowitz, Paul Oetken, First Openly Gay US. Federal Judge, Confirmed by Senate,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2011, 1:18 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/19/paul-oetken-
gay-judge n_902998.html.





6'9 Id at 275 tbl.2.
7o Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 275 tbl.2 & 281
tbl.5.
71 Id.
72 See Monique Renee Foumet, Kyle C. Kopko, Dana Wittmer & Lawrence Baum, Evolution of
Judicial Careers in the Federal Courts, 1789-2008, 93 JUDICATURE 62, 63 (2009).
7 Goldman, Schiavoni & Slotnick, W Bush's Judicial Legacy, supra note 12, at 275 tbl.2.
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52.9% - whereas 44.3% of his traditional appointees had such experience. 74
Once again, nearly a third of his traditional appointees - 31.2% - had
neither prosecutorial nor judicial experience. 75
There appears to be a different career track for judges who are women
or racial and ethnic minorities than there is for White male judges. Judicial
or prosecutorial experience is almost a requirement. While the statistics
above are the latest for President George W. Bush's administration alone,
they are consistent with prior administrations as well. 76
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A DIVERSE BENCH
Having established that the federal bench is not as diverse as the
American population nor, in some instances, the lawyer population, it is
still important to examine why diversity on the bench is a goal worth
pursuing. There are a variety of arguments supporting diversifying the
judiciary. Political scientists have identified two overarching benefits to a
diverse bench. First, a diverse bench provides symbolic representation. 77
This means that diversity provides certain groups with the opportunity to
have access to positions of influence so that all members of society will
believe in the fairness of the system thereby adding legitimacy to the
judiciary. 78 Thus, the comparison of population data to the demographics
of the judiciary earlier in this article is particularly relevant. As Professor
Jeffrey Jackson explained, "Judges are not the exclusive province of any
one section of society. Rather, they must provide justice for all. In order for
a judicial section to be considered fair and impartial, it must be seen as
representative of the community." 79
Closely related to this idea is that diversity can improve decision
making by adding to the richness of debate and by influencing outcomes of
cases through the inclusion of diverse perspectives. As Professor Sherrilyn
Ifill explains:
[T]he creation of a racially diverse bench can introduce traditionally excluded
perspectives and values into judicial decision-making. The interplay of diverse
views and perspectives can enrich judicial decision-making. Because they can
74 Id.
5 Id.
76 See Theresa M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of Federal Judicial Appointments Affects
"Diversity" on the Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 849, 863-64 (2005) (discussing Clinton appointees).
n7 Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy &
Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 597 (1985).
7 R. William Ide III, Eradicating Bias in the Justice System, 80 A.B.A.J. 8 (1994); Tony Mauro,
Wider Courtroom Diversity Urged, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1999, at 3A; see generally Jane Mansbridge,
Should Blacks Represent Blacks & Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes", 61 J. POL. 628, 629
(1999) (discussing symbolic representation in general).
7 Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection & Their Application to
a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 145 (2007).
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bring important and traditionally excluded perspectives to the bench, minority
judges can play a key role in giving legitimacy to the narratives and values of
racial minorities.80
Professor Ifill also argues that racial diversity leads to greater impartiality
because it ensures that no "single set of values or views ... dominate
judicial decision-making." 8 '
The second overarching argument for diversity is what is known as the
functional or substantive representation function. 82 Under this theory,
members of under-represented groups will advocate for the interests of the
group to which they belong once appointed.83 This means that judges of
differing backgrounds will bring different perspectives to the bench based
on their own lived experience, which, potentially, could lead to differing
results or at the least the advocating of different results in lawsuits. 84 In
addition, scholars have argued "that simple fairness" supports increasing
the numbers of women judges. 85
Post-modem legal theorists would refer to functional representation as
an essentialist theory.86 Indeed the very idea that, for example, women will
decide a certain way in "women's cases" is essentialist. It assumes a
commonality of perspective among women that is likely unjustified, and
indeed studies on the effect of gender on the decisions of female judges
often have shown inconclusive effects. 87 While some studies support the
idea that female judges are more sympathetic to sex discrimination
plaintiffs and that African American male judges are more sympathetic to
both race and sex discrimination plaintiffs,88 it is important to note that the
vast number of federal appellate cases are decided by unanimous opinion
upholding the trial court.8 9 Much of the time, male and female judges and
so Ifill, supra note 7, at 410 (footnotes omitted).
81 Id. at 411; accord Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality &
Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 120 (1997).
82 See Walker & Barrow, supra note 77, at 597.
83 See id; cf Elaine Martin, The Representative Role of Women Judges, 77 JUDICATURE 166, 166
(1993).
84 See Ifill, supra note 7, at 412-13; Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist
Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891, 896-97 (1995).
85 See Martin, supra note 83, at 166.
86 See Ifill, supra note 7, at 414; Angela Harris, Race & Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585-89 (1990); Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, I
STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 171, 188 (2005); Sheila Foster, Difference & Equality: A Critical Assessment of
the Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 124 (1993).
87 See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender & Collegial Decisionmaking in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759, 1762-64 (2005) (noting an assortment of studies on the
potential effect gender may have on female judges when addressing certain issues). But see Nancy E.
Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex & Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
1981-1996 25 (June 1999) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, U. of Chicago) (stating that "sex differences
are real and . . . consequential").
88 See infra notes 114 to 127 and accompanying text.
89 See Crowe, supra note 87.
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Democratic and Republican appointed judges reach the same decisions.90
However, scholars who have eschewed the essentialism of a common
identity among all members of a particular group still agree that women
and racial and ethnic minorities have certain experiences in common. As
Professor Hsu explained with respect to Asian Americans, although there is
not a common "Asian American identity," Asian Americans, like other
members of racial and ethnic minority groups, have a common experience
of racial oppression that provides common ground, despite a myriad of
cultural differences within the group.91 Thus, ultimately, it is beneficial to
the courts when judges bring differing perspectives to a case that reflect the
varying experiences of Americans. It is possible to acknowledge this while
also being aware that there are a multitude of perspectives among women
as well as members of ethnic and racial minority groups.
Another theory that is sometimes relevant to a discussion on diversity is
critical mass theory.92 Under critical mass theory, in any given group, a
certain percentage of women or members of a minority group is necessary
in order to change stereotypical notions of that group.93 This argument was
used in the University of Michigan Law School affirmative action case to
support the University's efforts to diversify its law school.94 Indeed, most
women judges believe their presence on the bench has made a difference in
the way male judges perceive professional women.95 These studies may
suggest that the inclusion of openly gay and lesbian judges would likely
have important impacts for lesbian and gay people. Studies show that views
about lesbian and gay people change after individuals get to know people
in that community. 96 Thus, having members of the lesbian and gay
community who are open about their sexual orientation on the bench may
help change judicial attitudes about lesbian and gay people in general,
including gay and lesbian litigants.
Diversity on the bench also "provides role models for those historically
excluded." 97 Women judges themselves agree that they serve as positive
role models for women attorneys.98 These judges also have encouraged
9o See generally id.
" See Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, & Diversity on the Bench, 11
ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 92, 94-95 (2006).
92 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-20, 329-33 (2003).
93 See id.; see also CTR. FOR WOMEN IN GOv'T & CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 23, at 9.
94 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316, 318-20, 329-33.
5 See Martin, supra note 83, at 171 tbl.4 (71.4% of National Association of Women Judges
(NAWJ) members surveyed agreed with this statement).
16 See, e.g., Gregory B. Lewis, The Friends and Family Plan: Contact with Gays and Support for
Gay Rights, 39 POL'Y STUD. J. 217, 231 (2011) (("Those who know LGBs are substantially more likely
to support gay rights across the board.").
9 Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, & Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (2003).
9 Martin, supra note 83, at 170 tbl.3 (98% of NAWJ members surveyed agreed with this
statement).
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other women to become judges. 99 Providing positive role models is
particularly important for gay and lesbian youth, who tragically have higher
suicide rates.'00 Having highly regarded gay and lesbian judicial role
models could help increase self esteem and lead to higher achievement
among gay and lesbian people.
Diverse judges already have had an impact on the bench by helping
revise court policies. For example, women judges were key to the rise of
gender bias task forces throughout the United States.101 As a result of the
task force movement, at least in part, courts revised the rules governing the
conduct of judges, lawyers, and other court employees, and developed
education programs to train court personnel, judges, and others.102 The
California state court system's Access and Fairness Committee has been
particularly active, not only in developing programs to enhance gender
fairness, but also in identifying barriers to the justice system for people
with disabilities and examining bias based on sexual orientation. 103 In
addition, California's Sexual Orientation Fairness Subcommittee
specifically noted in its 2001 Report that "[tlhere has been a growing
awareness of the number of gay men and lesbians who are involved in
various ways with the court system, as judges, attorneys, court users, and
court employees." 04 The Report specifically noted that this has led to court
rules prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.105 Finally, her study of
women judges has led Elaine Martin to opine that "an increase in women
judges may have an important impact in broadening the gender attitudes of
the judiciary, and that these attitude changes may lead to changes in court
operations."l 06 This appears to be the case not only for women judges; in
some instances, court policies also reflect the influences of judges of color
and LGBT judges. 0 7
In the end, there are many good reasons to diversify the federal bench.
Whether the argument is based on issues of fairness, legitimacy, providing
role models, or incorporating a variety of American experiences and
99 See id. at 171 tbl.4 (89.9% of NAWJ members surveyed agreed with the statement, "Since I have
been a judge, I have made a special effort to encourage other women to seek judicial office.").
'0 See Robert Garofalo et al., Sexual Orientation & Risk of Suicide Attempts Among a
Representative Sample of Youth, 153 PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 487, 487 (1999), available at
http://hevratova.org.il/ Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/sexualorientation.pdf
'o1 See Martin, supra note 83, at 169.
102 See Myra C. Selby, Examining Race & Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of Indiference or
Opportunity?, 32 IND. L. REv. 1167, 1173-75 (1999) (describing and citing such changes).
103 CAL. JUD. COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, FINAL
REPORT 2 (1997), available at www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rebias.pdf.
" SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS SUBCOMM. OF THE JUD. COUNCIL'S ACCESS & FAIRNESS
ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS IN THE CAL. CTS. v (2001).
10 id.
106 Martin, supra note 83, at 172.
" See CAL. JUD. COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra
note 103.
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perspectives into judicial decision making, the case for a diverse judiciary
is strong.
Iv. THE INFLUENCE OF A JUDGE'S BACKGROUND ON DECISION MAKING
The assumptions of those who espouse the theories discussed in the
previous section is that a judge's background will influence how he or she
understands cases. Indeed, underlying Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina
woman" comment is the idea that people of different backgrounds will
bring different perspectives to the bench that may have an impact on
decision making.108 The effects of race, ethnicity, and gender on decision
making in particular are implicated in her remarks. So, was Justice
Sotomayor correct? Do these characteristics have an impact on case
outcomes? Studies suggest that sometimes they do. 109
A. Studies of the Impact ofRace and Gender ofJudge
Early studies on the effect of gender, race or ethnicity of judges on case
outcomes showed mixed results - some studies showed no effect while
others showed some effect. 110 However, more recent studies have shown
effects based on race and gender, especially in cases involving employment
discrimination and certain types of civil rights. 1 '
Several studies show that race and gender affect voting patterns of
judges in employment discrimination cases.112 For example, political
scientist Nancy Crowe studied race and sex discrimination cases decided in
the United States courts of appeals between 1981 and 1996.113 Her study
focused on non-unanimous cases, i.e., those in which the panel disagreed
on the outcome. 114 She focused on these cases because they have the most
potential for a judge's ideology to play a role, due to apparent room for
disagreement." Included in Crowe's study were race, gender, and political
1os Sotamayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, CNN POLITICS (June 5, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-05/politics/sotomayor.speeches_sotomayor-s-confirmation-
sotomayor-supporters-judge-sonia-sotomayor? s=PM:POLITICS [hereinafter Sotomayor's 'Wise
Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches].
1o9 See Crowe, supra note 87; Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds & Judicial Decision Making,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (1966) (analyzing the influence of life experience prior to ascending to the
bench on judicial decision making).
"o See generally Grossman, supra note 109 (describing studies which show correlation between
judicial background and case outcome). Cf Orley Ashenfelter et. al., Politics & the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 260 (1995) ("[T]he
characteristics of judges, including their political party and the party of their appointing president,
provide little help in explaining the interjudge variance in case outcomes.").
"i See generally Crowe, supra note 87 (presenting a compilation of studies pertaining to the effect
of race and gender on judicial decision making in sex and race discrimination cases in an employment
context).
112 id.
"' Id. at 56.
114 id.
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party of appointing president.1 6 These factors had an impact in several
instances. For example, women and African American judges were more
likely to vote for a sex discrimination plaintiff than their White male
counterparts.1 7 There was a strong correlation between political party and
the decision in sex discrimination cases.118 For example, a White male
Democrat appointed judge voted for .the sex discrimination plaintiff in
these cases 76% of the time, whereas his Republican appointed counterpart
did so 28% of the time. 19 There was also evidence of a partisanship effect
on sex discrimination decisions for women and African American male
judges.120 While White female judges and African American male judges
who were appointed by Democrats voted consistently for the sex
discrimination plaintiff (White females - 90%; Black males - 93%), their
Republican counterparts were far less likely to vote for the sex
discrimination plaintiff (White female judges - 53%; Black male judges -
61%).121 Still, the Republican appointed White female judges and Black
male judges were much more likely to vote for the sex discrimination
plaintiff than their White male counterparts.122
The findings in race discrimination cases were a bit different. There
was little difference between White men and White women appointed by
presidents of the same political party, but there was a difference for African
American male judges.123 Thus, White male and White female judges
appointed by a Democrat voted for a race discrimination claimant in 49%
and 51% of the cases respectively.124 However, their African American
male counterparts did so in 85% of the cases. 125 There was a similar pattern
for judges appointed by Republican presidents. Thus, White male judges
and White female judges appointed by Republican presidents voted for the
race discrimination plaintiff 20% and 21% of the time respectively.126
Their African American male counterparts voted for the race discrimination
plaintiff 60% of the time. 127 Thus, political party was the decisive factor for
White male and female judges, whereas race correlated for African
American male judges in these cases. Similarly, Songer, Davis, and Haire
16 Id at 2.
117 Crowe, supra note 87, at 83 fig. 3.1. Crowe did not include female African American judges in
her sample because at the time of her study there were an insufficient number of such judges for
purposes of statistical analysis. Id. at 81 n.25.




122 See Crowe, supra note 87, at 83 fig.3.1.






White Male Heterosexist Norms in the Confirmation Process
found in a 1994 study that female federal appellate judges were much more
likely than men to support victims of discrimination. 128
Other studies are consistent with respect to the effect of gender of
appellate judges in sex discrimination cases. In a 1986 study of state
supreme court justices, Gryski, Main and Dixon found that the presence of
a woman on the court increased decisions in favor of sex discrimination
appellants. 129 In addition, recent studies of appellate courts show that the
presence of a female judge on a panel increases the likelihood that a male
judge will vote for a plaintiff alleging discrimination. 130
More recently, Sarah Westergren looked at sex discrimination decisions
from the United States Courts of Appeals during 1994-2000.131 While the
sex of the judge did have an effect in these cases, it did not reach the 0.05
level that would be required for statistical significance. 132 Instead, political
party of appointing president and race of the judge were better
predictors. 133 Judges who were members of minority groups were more
likely to vote for the sex discrimination plaintiff than White judges. 134 In
addition, judges who were appointed by Democrats were more likely to
vote for sex discrimination plaintiffs than those appointed by
Republicans. 135 Results such as these have led some to opine that the
differences in voting patterns between men and women are better explained
by the political party of the appointing president rather than gender.136
There are many articles describing these studies in detail.137
Similarly, results from studies of the federal district courts have found
political affiliation of appointing president playing more of a role.
Professor Jennifer Segal studied the effects of race and gender on judicial
decision making, but her study focused on the federal district courts.138
Unlike Crowe, Segal's study focused only on Clinton appointees to
128 Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects
in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 434 (1994) (noting that "in sharp contrast to the results in
obscenity and search and seizure cases, the coefficient for gender is positive, robust and statistically
significant").
129 Gerard S. Gryski et. al., Models of State High Ct. Decision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases,
48 J. POL. 143, 153 (1986).
130 Peresic, supra note 87, at 1765; Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. Sci. 389, 406 (2010).
131 Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts ofAppeals Revisited: The Data Since 1994,
92 GEO. L.J. 689, 690 (2004).
132 Id. at 703-04.
1 Id. at 704.
134 Id.
135 id.
136 See Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism & the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Re-
Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 313-15 (2010).
137 For more on the social science of judicial decision-making, see Theresa M. Beiner, What Will
Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 137-146 (1999) and
Westergren, supra note 13 1.
138 Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District
Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 137-38 (2000).
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determine whether there were differences in voting behaviors based on race
and/or gender of the judge.139 She ultimately studied 799 cases for gender
and 701 cases for race. 140 For sex, the study addressed "women's issues,"
including cases about "gender discrimination, sexual harassment, abortion
rights and maternity rights, custody battles, and equal pay." 141 Her race
cases included "race discrimination, voting rights, school desegregation,
and affirmative action."1 42 In addition, the study included "ethnic,
disability, age and poverty discrimination,.. . alien rights," personal liberty
cases, "criminal rights cases," and "federal economic regulation cases" in
both the race and gender analyses.143 There ultimately was little difference
found in case outcomes based on the race or sex of the district court judge,
and where she found differences, they were often unexpected.144 For
example, she found no statistically significant differences based on the sex
of the judge except in cases pertaining to women's issues, wherein the male
judges were more supportive of the women's position than the female
judges.145 Carp, Manning and Stidham had similar results in a study of
Clinton district court appointees in criminal, civil rights and liberties, and
labor and economic relations cases. 146 This study found that Clinton's
White male appointees rendered liberal decision more often than his
nontraditional appointees. 147 Thus, while not all studies show race or
gender effects, at least in court of appeals discrimination decisions, a
judge's race and sex have been shown to correlate with voting records.
Thus, diversity seems to make a difference in certain situations.
B. Other Evidence of the Diference that Difference Makes
Some judges have acknowledged the impact that differences in
background can make in the judiciary. Justice Sotomayor was not the first
to make this suggestion with her "wise Latina woman" comment. For
example, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has noted "[w]omen bring a
different life experience to the table. All of our differences make the
judicial conferences better. That I'm a woman is part of it."1 48 Similarly,
federal appellate judge A. Wallace Tashima explained that his life
experiences, including being evacuated from his home and moved to an
internment camp during World War II, "shaped the way I view my job as a
'" Id. at 142.




144 Segal, supra note 138, at 144-45 tbls.2 & 3.
145 Id. at 144-45, 146 tbl.3.
146 See Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning & Ronald Stidham, President Clinton's District
Judges: "Extreme Liberals" or Just Plain Moderates?, 84 JUDICATURE 282, 286 (2001).
1'4 See id. at 286, tbl.3.
148 CTR. FOR WOMEN IN Gov'T & CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 23, at 1.
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federal judge and the skepticism that I sometimes bring to the
representations and motives of the other branches of government."1 49
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained the impact of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's background on Supreme Court discussions:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories and
experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. His was the eye of
a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social fabric and used law to help
heal them. His was the ear of a counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of
the accused and established safeguards for their protection. His was the mouth
of a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice.
At oral arguments and conference meetings, in opinions and dissents, Justice
Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences,
constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness
of legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.1 0
Thus, judges from a variety of ethnic and racial backgrounds have
acknowledged that their backgrounds and the backgrounds of their
colleagues can have an impact in a variety of ways on the court system.
Justice O'Connor's own experiences likely affected her judging. Sex
discrimination in employment was very real to her; after graduation from
Stanford Law School, the only job offer she received was as a legal
secretary.' 5 This is not to say that so-called "traditional" judges-White
males-cannot attain this perspective. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor in her
lecture containing the now infamous "wise Latina woman" comment, noted
that:
I . .. believe that we should not be so myopic as to believe that others of
different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of understanding the values
and needs of people from a different group. Many are so capable .... [N]ine
white men on the Supreme Court have done so on many occasions and on
many issues including Brown.152
Thus, while it is certainly possible for traditional appointees to see the
perspective of others, those with direct experiences in different
19 A. Wallace Tashima, Play It Again, Uncle Sam, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2005),
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?68+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+7+(spring+2005).
Iso Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1217, 1217 (1992).
15' Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation & Its Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 251, 269 (2009) (citing Adam Cohen, Editorial, Why
Justice O'Connor Could Be Affirmative Action's Unlikely Savior, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2003, § 4, at 12;
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33
TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997)).
152 Sotomayor, supra note 2, at 92.
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communities may find it easier to understand the perspectives of those
communities and raise those perspectives with colleagues.
A study of female judges suggests that they perceive themselves as
more sensitive to issues of sex discrimination and believe they bring a
unique perspective to the bench.153 In her study of female state court
judges, political scientist Elaine Martin asked the judges if they agreed,
were neutral on, or disagreed with various statements about the role of
female judges.' 5 4 One of the statements read as follows: "[w]omen judges
are probably more sensitive to claimants raising issues of sexual
discrimination than are men."1 55 Of those responding, 67.77% of those who
were members of the National Association of Women Judges ("NAWJ")
agreed, and 52.7% of those who were non-member women judges agreed
as well.156 In addition, 85.37% of NAWJ members and 63.59% of non-
member women judges agreed that "[w]omen have certain unique
perspectives and life experiences, different from those of men that ought to
be represented on the bench by women judges." 157 Some NAWJ members
also believed that their "presence on the bench has made a difference in the
way men judges think about how their decisions will affect women as a
group." 58 Finally, 80.3% of NAWJ members who were surveyed agreed
that "[w]omen judges work formally and informally within their court
systems to heighten the sensitivity of other judges to potential problems
with gender bias in the courtroom and in substantive law."' 59 Likewise,
76.9% agreed that "[w]omen judges have an influence on how their judicial
colleagues perceive cases involving women's issues." 160
Evidence of differences in perspectives among judges of differing
backgrounds is likewise supported by the work of gender, race, and ethnic
bias task forces. For example, California's Advisory Committee on Gender
Bias in the Courts found that approximately 63% of women judges
believed that gender bias against women was widespread and apparent or
subtle in the California courts, whereas less than 24% of male judges
believed the bias was widespread.161 In addition, approximately 45% of
female judges responded that they on occasion or frequently observed
judges make remarks considered demeaning to women in and out of the
'" Martin, supra note 83, at 166.
154 Id. at 169-70.
's Id. at 169 tbl.2.
156 Id
157 id.
'" Id. at 171 tbl.4 (finding that 35.2% of NAWJ members agree and 39.2% of NAWJ members are
neutral in regards to that statement).
1" Martin, supra note 83, at 170 tbl.3.
16 Id.
6' JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR WOMEN & MEN IN THE CAL. COURTS: FINAL REPORT 30 (Gay Danforth & Bobbie L.
Welling eds., 1996), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/f-report.pdf.
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courtroom, whereas only 6.6% of male judicial officers did so. 162 Based on
these experiences and perceptions, women judges may have more
understanding about the circumstances that give rise to an action for sex
discrimination.
Race and gender likewise play a part in how judges treat individuals
appearing before them. The D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and
Ethnic Bias found that 33% of minority women lawyers (as well as 33% of
African American women lawyers as a subgroup) responded that a federal
judge had questioned their status as a lawyer or assumed that they were not
a lawyer; comparatively, only 9.9% of White women and 10% of minority
men reported such behavior.163 The number is even smaller for White men,
of whom only 1% reported such behavior.164 It is not much of a leap to
imagine, for example, that African American women judges, who have
such experiences, will treat lawyers of color respectfully in the courtroom.
Thus, the experiences of these diverse lawyers, if given an opportunity to
serve on the bench, might lead to more respectful treatment of women and
members of minority groups who are litigants, witnesses, and lawyers in
the courtroom.
C. The Role of the Diverse Judge
While the statistics and anecdotal evidence noted above suggest that
some judges believe that their backgrounds influence how they perceive
certain types of cases, perhaps the most compelling evidence of difference
comes from judicial decisions themselves. Indeed, how a judge's
background affects a case is best demonstrated by looking at real lawsuits
involving nontraditional judges.
Judge Carlos Lucero is a Latino sitting federal judge on the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 165 In Vigil v. City of Las Cruces,166 Judge Lucero
dissented from a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc. 167 At trial,
plaintiff Mary Ann Rocha Vigil complained about sexual and racial
harassment by her supervisor.168 Ms. Vigil alleged that her supervisor
frequently referred to Hispanics as "wetbacks," and that he commented that
"I didn't know that Mexicans had rights."1 69 This same supervisor offered
162 Id. at 110.
163 Special Comm. on Gender, Report to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race & Ethnic
Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1743 (1996).
64 Id.
165 History of the Federal Judiciary, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Lucero, Carlos, F.,
FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1434&cid=25&ctype-ac&instate=10 (last
visited Oct. 11, 2010). I use the word "Latino" here because it was noted that Judge Lucero was one of
President Clinton's Latino appointees. See Sylvia R. Lazo Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of
Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1438-39 n. 87 (2008).
16 119 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1997).
167 Id. at 871.
i6 Id at 871-72 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (internal citation omitted). I use the term "Hispanic" because that is the term the court used.
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her pornographic software and constantly asked her to go flying with him
in spite of her repeated refusals. 170 The panel majority held that the
supervisor's alleged actions were insufficiently severe or pervasive to
amount to actionable racial or sexual harassment as a matter of law. 171 In
his dissent to denial of rehearing, Judge Lucero explained why he disagreed
with the panel's assessment of Ms. Vigil's racial harassment claim:
In affirming summary judgment for the City of Las Cruces, the panel holds
that it is per se unreasonable for a Hispanic worker to consider what she
describes as her supervisor's "frequent" references to "wetbacks" as being
hostile or abusive. I am disappointed that the panel reaches that conclusion;
more importantly, I can see no legal or factual basis to support it. The term
"wetback" is severely degrading.... Accordingly, its use hardly needs to be
pervasive for a Hispanic employee to find her work environment hostile and
abusive - and reasonably so.
Judge Lucero understood how this term could be sufficiently severe to
satisfy the standard for racial harassment; the other judges did not. 173 Did
Judge Lucero's background increase his understanding of Ms. Vigil's
situation? Certainly a Hispanic judge could understand the feelings and
reactions that use of a term such as "wetback" would engender in a
170 id.
171 Vigil v. City of Las Cruces, No. 96-2059, 1997 WL 265095, at *2-3 (10th Cir. May 20, 1997).
172 Vigil, 119 F.3d at 874 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
171 Vigil, 1997 WL 265095 at *3. Judge Lucero also wrote a compelling dissent to a denial of
rehearing en banc in Alexander v. Oklahoma, a civil rights case brought by the survivors and
descendants of survivors of a racially based attack that destroyed the African American community in
Greenwood, Oklahoma. Alexander v. Oklahoma, 391 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Lucero argued:
No case in my tenure on the court could be more compellingly described as meeting the
Rule 35 en banc standard of presenting a "question of exceptional importance" deserving
the attention of the entire court than this. In one of the more shameful events in our nation's
history, over two hundred African-Americans were slaughtered and a whole section of the
City of Tulsa was burned in an uncontrolled riot in 1921. Official government action by the
City of Tulsa and the State of Oklahoma fueled this carnage by deputizing and arming the
mob, and authorizing the National Guard to detain the victims while their forty-two square
block community was razed to the ground. (It is inconceivable that a government
investigation of the incident of September 11 would have failed to count every person who
perished, yet telling of the attitude that prevailed in Oklahoma in 1921 is that no effort was
made to determine officially the number of those who died there.) All subsequent claims
raised by the victims fell upon the deaf ears of the courts at the time, and most languished
without even a cursory glance at the merits. None of the over one hundred lawsuits filed
were successful. In a perversion of justice, a grand jury commissioned by the state
exonerated the city and state, and all white rioters, and blamed the victims for the atrocity.
This history alone raises a "question of exceptional importance" - the laudable recent
investigation of this tragedy the State of Oklahoma compels us to confront it.
Id. For a description of the facts found at trial, see Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1211-12
(10th Cir. 2004).
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Hispanic listener. It is likely that non-Hispanic judges would have less
understanding of the implications of such language on a Hispanic
employee.
Other examples of a judge's background affecting decision making on
the bench include several rather recent cases in which Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg disagreed (at least in part) with the majority, and even expressed
public exasperation at the positions of her fellow Justices. 174 Much of the
public discussion came as a result of comments made by Justice Ginsburg
about being the only female justice on the Court after the retirement of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.175 Several cases, in particular, made Justice
Ginsburg wish for a fellow female justice. For example, Safford Unified
School District v. Reddingl76 involved the strip search of a thirteen- year-
old girl to locate ibuprofen, a "drug" that was considered contraband in her
school.' 77 After oral argument, Justice Ginsburg made the following
observation to the media regarding her male colleagues, "[t]hey have never
been a 13-year-old girl. . . . It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I didn't think
that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood."178 While Justice
Ginsburg placed herself in the thirteen- year-old girl's position, fellow
Justice Stephen Breyer likened the search to changing for gym class. 179
Although the Court ultimately held that the search was unreasonable, the
majority agreed that the administrator who ordered it was protected by
qualified immunity.180 Dissenting in part, Justice Ginsburg disagreed,
arguing that the search violated "clearly established" law and therefore the
girl was entitled to a remedy.181 In particular, Justice Ginsburg focused on
the continued humiliation of plaintiff Savanna Redding even after school
officials found no contraband during their strip search.' 8 2 As she explained,
To make matters worse, Wilson did not release Redding, to return to class or to
go home, after the search. Instead, he made her sit on a chair outside his office
for over two hours. At no point did he attempt to call her parent. Abuse of
authority of that order should not be shielded by official immunity. 183
174 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg N.htm.
175 See id.
176 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
171 Id. at 2637-38.
178 Biskupic, supra note 174.
179 See Robert Barnes, Justices' Take on Strip Search Vary, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/21/AR2009042103695.html.
Iso Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
"' Id. at 2645-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, in a
concurrence and dissent in which Justice Ginsburg joined, agreed with this position. See id. at 2644-45
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (describing this as a case in which "clearly established law
meets clearly outrageous conduct").
" Id at 2645-46.
* Id. at 2645.
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Similarly, Justice Ginsburg dissented in and publicly commented on
two cases involving sex discrimination, AT&T Corp. v. Hulteenl84 and
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.185 In Ledbetter, the Court held
that the decision to set an employee's pay was a "discrete act" that
triggered the 180-day EEOC filing period for purposes of filing a claim
under Title VII.186 Lily Ledbetter, a supervisor for Goodyear for nearly
twenty years, was paid significantly less than similarly situated male
supervisors.187 Because Ledbetter filed her charge of discrimination more
than 180 days after Goodyear made the discriminatory decisions, the Court
held that her claim was time-barred even though she continued to receive
reduced pay compared to her male colleagues within the 180-day charge
filing period. 88
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg examined the workplace realities of a
woman employed in a traditionally male field and read the statute to
encompass Ledbetter's claims.' 89 She explained, "[clomparative pay
information ... is often hidden from the employee's view ... Small initial
discrepancies may not be seen as meet [sic] for a federal case, particularly
when the employee, trying to succeed in a nontraditional environment, is
averse to making waves."190 Justice Ginsburg personally understood the
context in which Ledbetter was working - a woman among many men -
and took into consideration what might cause a delay in addressing her
salary concerns. Thus, Ledbetter was reasonable in waiting to complain
until these disparities became "apparent and sizable." 91 Reasoning that pay
differentials of this sort result from a series of discrete acts, Justice
Ginsburg forcefully argued that the standard developed for sexual
harassment claims, whereby only one act of continuing harassing behavior
need occur within the 180-day charge filing period to be timely, should
apply.192 She also noted that in a disparate pay case, the employer
continuously benefits from paying a woman lower wages than male
counterparts.1 93 Justice Ginsburg also detailed the evidence that Ledbetter's
pay differential was indeed based on sex discrimination.194 This evidence
' 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
as 550 U.S. 618, 621-22 (2007), superseded by statute, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009).
116 550 U.S. at 621.
... Id. at 621-22.
18 Id. at 632.
189 Id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'9 Id.
I91 Id.
192 550 U.S. at 648-49.
'9' Id. at 650 (noting that the employer is enriched by paying a woman less than a man for the same
work).
194 Id. at 659-60. Included in this evidence were such discrepancies as Goodyear's suggestion that
the pay differential was based on Ledbetter's poor performance, and yet Ledbetter received a "Top
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was notably absent from the majority opinion. In response to the majority's
holding in this case, Justice Ginsburg read her dissenting opinion from the
bench, ending with a call to Congress to amend the statute to overturn the
decision.195
In Hulteen, the Court permitted AT&T to decrease pension benefits for
women who took time off for disabilities related to pregnancy (even though
leave for other disabilities did not count against an employee's benefits).196
As Justice Ginsburg explained:
The history of women in the paid labor force underpinned and corroborated the
views of the lower courts and the EEOC. In generations preceding - and
lingering long after - the passage of Title VII, that history demonstrates,
societal attitudes about pregnancy and motherhood severely impeded women's
employment opportunities.
She continued in the opinion to discuss the history of widespread
discrimination against women based on pregnancy in the United States. As
she further stated, "[c]ertain attitudes about pregnancy and childbirth,
throughout human history, have sustained pervasive, often law-sanctioned,
restrictions on a woman's place among paid workers and active
citizens."198 As the media reported, Ginsburg remarked that oral argument
in Hulteen was, "'just, for me, Ledbetter repeated' . . . adding that her
colleagues showed 'a certain lack of understanding' of the bias a woman
can face on the job."199 In summary, Justice Ginsburg explained,
'You know the line that Sandra [Day O'Connor] and I keep repeating . .. that
'at the end of the day, a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same
judgment'? But there are perceptions that we have because we are women. It's
a subtle influence. We can be sensitive to things that are said in draft opinions
that (male justices) are not aware can be offensive.
200
Justice Ginsburg noted that while "the differences between male and
female justices . . . are 'seldom in the outcome," she further acknowledged,
"it is sometimes in the outcome." 201
Performance Award" in 1996. Id. at 659. Toward the end of her career, the plant manager told her "that
the plant did not need women, that [women] didn't help it, [and] caused problems." Id. at 660.
' Biskupic, supra note 174; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 ("Once again, the ball is in Congress' court.
As in 1991, the Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII.").
' 129 S. Ct. at 1966-67. The policy was applied to women who took pregnancy leave prior to
enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which now prohibits such practices. Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (1978).
'97 Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. at 1974 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1' Id. at 1978.
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In Safford, the majority agreed with Justice Ginsburg that a strip search
of a thirteen-year-old girl for ibuprofen was unconstitutional, but the Court
still afforded her no relief.202 Given the statements of some Justices during
oral argument,203 it would be interesting to know if Justice Ginsburg's
understanding of a thirteen year-old girl's perception swayed this outcome.
V. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING RECENT "NONTRADITIONAL" SUPREME
COURT CANDIDATES
Both Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan encountered
difficulties during their confirmation process because of statements made in
academic settings. 204 Ironically enough, their statements suggest that they
would bring a diversity of perspective for which those who argue for a
diverse bench advocate. However, rather than being embraced for the
diversity they would bring, these two Supreme Court nominees were
harangued for it. For Justice Sotomayor, the statements that caused
controversy were made in a speech given at a law school.205 For Justice
Kagan, it was a position she took as Dean of Harvard's law school. 206
Examining reactions to the statements also reveals the prevalence of White
male heterosexist norms and the resistance of certain members of the
committee to anyone who challenges these norms.
A. Justice Sotomayor's Hearing & Public Commentary
Justice Sonia Sotomayor took a great deal of heat during her
confirmation hearing as well as in the media for her "wise Latina woman"
comment 207 and her decision in the Ricci v. DeStefano208 case. In response
202 129 S. Ct. at 2637-38.
203 In one telling exchange, Justice Breyer likened the search in Safford to changing clothes in gym
class. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/08-479.pdf. As he
stated, "I'm trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down to your underclothes, which
children do when they change for gym, they do fairly frequently, not to-you know, and there are only
two women there. Is-how bad is this, underclothes? That's what I'm trying to get at. I'm asking
because I don't know. Id. at 45. Justice Ginsburg was quick to respond: "Mr. Wolf, one thing should be
clarified. I don't think there's any dispute what was done in the case of both of these girls. It wasn't just
that they were stripped to their underwear. They were asked to shake their bra out, to-to shake, stretch
the top of their pants and shake that out. There's no dispute, factual dispute about that, is there?" Id.
Justice Ginsburg also recognized the humiliation the plaintiff might have felt by being left outside the
vice principal's office after the search turned up nothing. Id. at 19-20. Her fellow Justice Scalia,
responded to Justice Ginsburg's concerns by explaining, "I assume a school can assign a student to
study hall. That's not considered a government seizure. Isn't that an obvious part of the parental
supervision that a school exercises, sit here and stay there." Id. at 20.
2 See Sotomayor 's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, supra note 108; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, At Harvard, Kagan Aimed Slights Higher, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/us/politics/26kagan.html?pagewanted=all.
205 See Sotomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, supra note 108.
206 id.
207 See Sotomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, supra note 108.
130 [Vol. 32
White Male Heterosexist Norms in the Confirmation Process
to the "wise Latina woman" comment, one commentator explained that
"her basic proposition seems to be that White males (with some exceptions,
she noted) are inferior to all other groups in the qualities that make for a
good jurist."209 While this commentator conceded that he also supported
diversification of the bench, he asked, "[d]o we want a new justice who
comes close to stereotyping White males as (on average) inferior
beings?" 210 In the popular media, Rush Limbaugh noted that Justice
Sotomayor "brings a form of bigotry and racism to the Court," and
analogized her nomination to that of David Duke, former head of the Ku
Klux Klan.211 Newt Gingrich tweeted with reference to Justice
Sotomayor's "wise Latina woman" statement that "new racism is no better
than old racism." 212
The Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee had
similar reactions to both the "wise Latina woman" comment as well as the
Ricci case. 213 In both the statements and questioning, they suggested that
the comment and the Ricci case called into question Justice Sotomayor's
fitness as a judge.214 This excerpt from Senator Jeff Sessions' statement
provides an example:
I want to be clear:
I will not vote for-and no senator should vote for-an individual nominated by
any President who is not fully committed to fairness and impartiality toward
every person who appears before them.
I will not vote for-and no Senator should vote for-an individual nominated by
any President who believes it is acceptable for a judge to allow their personal
background, gender, prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor
of, or against, parties before the court. In my view, such a philosophy is
disqualifying.
Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling the game is not
neutral, but instead feels empowered to favor one team over the other.
208 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev d 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
209 Taylor, supra note 1.
210 Id.
211 Rachel Weiner, Limbaugh: Nominating Sotomayor Like Nominating David Duke, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/29/limbaugh-nominating-sotom n_209151.html (last
updated June 29, 2009).
212 Huma Khan & Jake Tapper, Newt Gingrich on Twitter: Sonia Sotomayor 'Racist', Should
Withdraw, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/SoniaSotomayor/story?id=7685284#.Tr2b37K6Sul.
213 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the U.S. Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Sen., 111th Cong. 7-8 (2009)
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Sotomayor
Hearings], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgidbname= 11 senate hearings&docid=f:56940.pdf.
214 See id
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Call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not
law. In truth, it is more akin to politics, and politics has no place in the
courtroom.
Some will respond, "Judge Sotomayor would never say it's acceptable for a
judge to display prejudice in a case." But I regret to say, Judge, that some of
your statements that I will outline seem to say that clearly. Let's look at just a
few examples.
And during a speech 15 years ago, Judge Sotomayor said, "I willingly accept
that we who judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and
heritage but attempt .. . continuously to judge when those opinions,
sympathies, and prejudices are appropriate."
And in the same speech, she said, "my experiences will affect the facts I
choose to see . . ."
Having tried a lot of cases, that particular phrase bothers me. I expect every
judge to see all the facts.
So I think it is noteworthy that, when asked about Judge Sotomayor's now-
famous statement that a "wise Latina" would come to a better conclusion that
others, President Obama, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, and
Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg declined to defend the substance of those
remarks. 2 15
Senator Sessions suggests that Justice Sotomayor is "prejudiced" and unfit
to be a judge because of her admission that her background has some
impact on her decision making. 216 The inference is that because she does
not see the world in the same way that Senator Sessions does, her view
brings a prejudicial perspective that his does not. Yet, Senator Sessions'
impression that his version of the world is somehow "neutral" while Justice
Sotomayor's is not is fundamentally flawed. Everyone approaches the
world with a personal perspective. That Senator Sessions viewed his as
"neutral" suggests that his viewpoint has such dominance in American
discourse that he does not even understand it as a perspective. That
presumption does not make it "correct" or "unbiased." 217
215 Id at 6-7.
216 Id. at 7-8.
217 Many critical theorists write about this phenomenon with respect to the privilege of being white.
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y, 245, 247
(2005) ("Characteristics of the privileged group define the societal norm."). Barbara Flagg, in her
groundbreaking article, explained it well:
The most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of whiteness is that most of the
time we don't have any. I call this the transparency phenomenon: the tendency of whites
not to think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that
are white-specific. Transparency often is the mechanism through which white
decisionmakers who disavow white supremacy impose white norms on blacks.
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Senator Sessions moved on to the Ricci case:
I am concerned by Ricci, the New Haven Firefighters case - recently reversed
by the Supreme Court - where she agreed with the City of New Haven's
decision to change the promotion rules in the middle of the game. Incredibly,
her opinion consisted ofjust one substantive paragraph of analysis.
Judge Sotomayor has said that she accepts that her opinions, sympathies, and
prejudices will affect her rulings. Could it be that her time as a leader in the
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, a fine organization, provides
a clue to her decision against the firefighters?
While the nominee was Chair of that fund's Litigation Committee, the
organization aggressively pursued racial quotas in city hiring and, in numerous
cases, fought to overturn the results of promotion exams. It seems to me that in
Ricci, Judge Sotomayor's empathy for one group of firefighters turned out to
be prejudice against another.2
Thus, Justice Sotomayor's statements and experience in a group dedicated
to the civil rights of people of Puerto Rican descent render her once again
prejudiced and unfit to be a Supreme Court Justice. The idea that her Latina
background might affect how she decides a case is viewed as disqualifying
rather than as enriching how she might understand certain cases.
Similarly, Senator Chuck Grassley, a Republican Senator from Iowa,
stated:
In yet another speech, you proclaimed that the court of appeals is where policy
is made. Your "wise Latina" comment starkly contradicts a statement by
Justice O'Connor that a wise old man and a wise old woman would eventually
reach the same conclusion in a case.
These statements go directly to your views of how a judge should use his or
her background and experience when deciding cases. Unfortunately, I fear they
do not comport with what I and many others believe is the proper role of a
judge or an appropriate judicial method.
The American legal system requires that judges check their biases, personal
preferences, and politics at the door of the courthouse. Lady Justice stands
before the Supreme Court with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice. Just
like Lady Justice, judges and Justices must wear blindfolds when they interpret
the Constitution and administer justice.
Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness & the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993). For a similar discussion of male norms, see
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237-38 (1989) ("In male
supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil society in the form of the objective standard
- that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world, does not appear to function as a standpoint
at all.").
218 Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 213, at 7-8.
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I will be asking you about your ability to wear that judicial blindfold. I will be
asking you about your ability to decide cases in an impartial manner and in
accordance with the law and the Constitution. I will be asking you about your
judicial philosophy, whether you allow biases and personal preferences to
dictate your judicial methods.
I am looking to support a restrained jurist committed to the rule of law and the
Constitution. I am not looking to support a creative jurist who will allow his or
her background and personal preferences to decide cases.2 19
Senator Grassley also addresses the "wise Latina woman" statement and
contrasts its implications with that of the idyllic, blind "lady justice,"
suggesting that Justice Sotomayor will not be able to fulfill the role of an
impartial decision maker.220 Rather than viewing her Latina background as
positive, he relegates it to the status of a "personal preference."
Finally, Senator Jon Kyl, from Arizona, summed up the tenor of these
remarks well:
With a background that creates a prima facie case for confirmation, the
primary question I believe Judge Sotomayor must address in this hearing is her
understanding of the role of an appellate judge. From what she has said, she
appears to believe that her role is not constrained to objectively decide who
wins based on the weight of the law, but rather who in her personal opinion,
should win. The factors that will influence her decisions apparently include her
gender and Latina heritage and foreign legal concepts that as she said, get her
creative juices going.22 1
According to Senator Kyl, Justice Sotomayor would not decide a case
based on unbiased application of the law to the facts, but instead based on
"personal opinion," influenced by her gender and Latina heritage.
When Senator Sessions raised the issue of the Ricci case during his
questioning, he noted that Judge Cabranes, "himself of Puerto Rican
ancestry," had voted to reconsider the decision en banc.222 He explained
that the media reported that Judge Cabranes was concerned with the
outcome of that case.223 Senator Sessions' comments suggest that he
believed that Judge Cabranes, unlike Justice Sotomayor in the Ricci case,
was acting appropriately in supporting the White and Hispanic firefighters'
position.
Senator Lindsey Graham, a Republican from South Carolina, stated that
his "Republican colleagues who voted against you I assure you could vote
219 Id. at 18 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
220 id.
221 Id. at 21 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
222 Id. at 75 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
223 Id. at 74. One of the plaintiffs in the Ricci case was Hispanic. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671.
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for a Hispanic nominee. They just feel unnerved by your speeches and by
some of the things that you have said and some of your cases." 224 Thus,
while Republicans would vote for the "right" kind of Hispanic, Justice
Sotomayor, as evidenced by her cases (e.g., Ricci) and speeches (e.g.,
"wise Latina woman"), was not the "right" kind.
Was Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina" statement really so
controversial? If it is understood in the context in which she said it, the
answer is "no." 225 Justice Sotomayor made the "wise Latina woman"
comment during the annual Judge Mario G. Olmos lecture at the University
of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law. 226 She made it in the
context of a frank discussion about the impact her background might make
in her judging. She began her discussion by exploring the differences
between people who could be characterized as Latina or Latino. 227 In a
very non-essentialist manner, Justice Sotomayor explained how some of
her Puerto Rican family customs would seem strange to a fellow Latina of
Mexican heritage. 228 She was acknowledging the range of experiences
among people who could be called "Latina," suggesting that there is no
universal Latina experience.
Justice Sotomayor explored the ideas of others who have opined on
diversity on the bench. For example, she mentioned a fellow jurist's
position that assuming women may be different than men as judges leads to
the same type of thinking that created many paternalistic laws. 229 However,
she also wondered "whether by ignoring our differences as women or men
of color we do a disservice both to the law and society." 23 0 Like her
interpretation of what it means to be a Latina, she also agreed that there is
no single voice of feminism, but instead a diversity of perspectives among
women. 231 Describing impartiality as an "aspiration" for judges, she
explained, "[n]ot all women or people of color, in all or some
circumstances or indeed in any particular case or circumstance but enough
people of color in enough cases, will make a difference in the process of
judging." 232
224 Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 213, at 26 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham).
225 Some have argued otherwise. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 1; Jennifer Rubin, 'A Wise Latina
Woman': The Context Shows that Judge Sotomayor Meant What She Said, WEEKLY STANDARD (June
15, 2009), available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/01 6/587tzqjm.asp.
226 The speech was reprinted in the Berkeley La Raza Law Journal at 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87
(2002). This was a phrase that Justice Sotomayor used in five or six speeches over the years.
Sotomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, supra note 108.
227 Sotomayor, supra note 2, at 88.
228 Id. at 88.
229 Id. at 90.
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Justice Sotomayor considered that White men have, in some instances,
made decisions that were helpful to women and racial and ethnic
minorities. 233 But, she also noted that many of the important race and
gender discrimination cases were brought by lawyers of color and women
lawyers.234 In the very next paragraph after her "wise Latina woman"
comment, she openly acknowledged that White male judges have voted for
sex and race discrimination claimants. 235 As she explained, "I . . . believe
that we should not be so myopic as to believe that others of different
experiences or backgrounds are incapable of understanding the values and
needs of people from a different group. Many are so capable." 236 She used
Brown v. Board ofEducation as an example.237
Yet, Justice Sotomayor also explained that people may not take the time
and effort to understand the perspectives of others who are not members of
their ethnic, gender, or racial group.238 While accepting that her
background will have an impact, she also explained her underlying role as
judge:
I am reminded each day that I render decisions that affect people concretely
and that I owe them constant and complete vigilance in checking my
assumptions, presumptions and perspectives and ensuring that to the extent
that my limited abilities and capabilities permit me, that I reevaluate them and
change as circumstances and cases before me requires ... I willingly accept
that we who judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and
heritage but attempt, as the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge
when those opinions, sympathies, and prejudices are appropriate. 239
This narrative reveals Justice Sotomayor to be a humble and thoughtful
judge who is willing to check her perspectives when appropriate and
engage them when it might be helpful in understanding the perspective of
litigants.
Interestingly, Justice Samuel Alito made similar comments about his
Italian American heritage, but his remarks received little comment during
his hearings. 24 0 As was raised by Senator Leahy during the Sotomayor
233 Sotomayor, supra note 2, at 91-92.
234 Id. at 92; see generally Edward V. Heck & Joseph Stewart, Jr., Ensuring Access to Justice: The
Role of Interest Group Lawyers in the 60s Campaign for Civil Rights, 66 JUDICATURE 84 (1982)
(discussing the role of lawyers of color and interest groups that engaged lawyers of color).
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hearings, Justice Alito stated during his confirmation hearings that "[w]hen
I get a case about discrimination, I have to think about people in my own
family who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or
because of religion or because of gender. And I do take that into
account." 241 Yet, there were no repercussions - either in the media or
during the confirmation hearings - as a result of Justice Alito's discussion
regarding how his ethnicity might impact his decision making. Are certain
types of diversity okay, while others are not?
B. Justice Kagan's Position on Gays in the Military
Justice Elena Kagan's hearing did not focus on her racial background or
her gender per se, but instead on the position she took on "don't ask/don't
tell" and military recruiting on campus while Dean at Harvard Law
School. 242 In addition, at least some Senators emphasized aspects of Justice
Kagan's background that put her outside the mainstream. 243 As Senator
Kyl stated, "[o]ne recent article noted that Ms. Kagan's experience draws
from a world whose signposts are distant from most Americans:
Manhattan's Upper West Side, Princeton University, Harvard Law School,
and the upper reaches of the Democratic legal establishment." 244 This,
coupled with her admiration for Justice Thurgood Marshall, made her a
questionable candidate for Republican Senators. For purposes of this
article, I will be focusing on the colloquy during the hearings and in the
media regarding military recruiting on Harvard's campus to see what it
might indicate about attitudes toward diversity.
Several Senators questioned Justice Kagan at length about Harvard's
position on military recruiting.245 Because of her position, it was implied
that Kagan was anti-military. 246 As Senator Kyl stated, "her tenure in the
academy was marred, in my view, by her decision to punish the military
and would-be recruits for a policy, '[d]on't ask/don't tell,' and the Solomon
amendment that was enacted by Members of Congress and signed into law
2 UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 19 (2006) (noting "the background issue of Alito's Italian heritage
occasionally seeped into discourse, but remained for the most part an issue vital only to those of Italian
extraction who saw any criticism of Alito as being driven by antipathy toward his - and their -
origins").
241 Linthicum, supra note 240.
242 CNN Wire Staff, Kagan Takes on GOP critics at Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing, CNN
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by President Clinton." 247 Similarly, Senator Sessions characterized
Kagan's treatment of the military at Harvard as a "revers[al]" of the policy
that had existed at Harvard, resulting in the military being "kicked . .. out
of the recruiting office in violation of federal law." 248 As he explained,
"[h]er actions punished the military and demeaned our soldiers as they
were courageously fighting for our country in two wars overseas." 249
Senator Sessions went on to use Justice Kagan's own words against her,
quoting her as saying "'I abhor the military's discrimination recruitment
policy. I consider it a profound wrong, a moral injustice of the first
order."' 250 In response to Kagan's position that the military was
accommodated through the use of a campus veterans group to arrange
interviews, Senator Sessions responded:
The military-you stopped complying [with the Solomon Amendment], and
that season was lost before the military realized -frankly, you never conveyed
that to them in a straight-up way like I think you should have. You just started
giving them a runaround. The documents we have gotten from the Department
of Defense say that the Air Force and the Army says [sic] they were blocked,
they were stonewalled, they were getting the run-around from Harvard. By the
time they realized that you had actually changed the policy, that recruiting
season was over, and the law was never not in force.
I feel like you mishandled that. I am absolutely confident you did. But you
continued to persist with this view that somehow there was a loophole in the
statute that Harvard did not have to comply with after Congress had written a
statute that would be very hard to get around. 251
When Justice Kagan tried to explain how she balanced Harvard's anti-
discrimination policy in recruiting, which included a policy that those who
used the placement office could not discriminate based on sexual
orientation, and the Solomon Amendment's requirements, Senator Sessions
characterized her actions as, "in fact . . . punishing the military." 25 2 This
was a theme taken up by Senator John Cornyn, who stated that "the sole
result and impact was to stigmatize the United States military on the
campus." 253 Additionally, Senator Sessions explained to Kagan that her
actions "helped create a climate that was not healthy toward the military on
campus." 254 Furthermore, Senator Sessions essentially characterized Kagan
as a law breaker - someone who acted in direct contravention to the
247 Kagan Hearing, supra note 244, at 19 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
248 Id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 71.
... Id. at 73.
252 Id. at 74.
253 Kagan Hearing, supra note 244, at 274 (statement of Sen. John Comyn).
254 Id. at 75 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
138 [ Vol. 32
White Male Heterosexist Norms in the Confirmation Process
congressionally enacted Solomon Amendment. 255 Justice Kagan's attempts
at explanation fell on deaf ears. Senator Sessions characterized Kagan's
position as "unconnected to reality," 256 explaining:
I know what happened at Harvard. I know you were an outspoken leader
against the military policy. I know you acted without legal authority to reverse
Harvard's policy and deny the military equal access to campus until you were
threatened by the U.S. government of loss of Federal funds. This is what
happened.257
So what did happen with military recruiting at Harvard during Kagan's
tenure as Dean? According to her testimony, prior to her tenure as Dean,
Harvard balanced the need to provide military access to its students with its
own anti-discrimination policy by allowing the military access to students
through a campus veteran's group.258 This, apparently, was fine with the
Department of Defense in the years prior to Kagan's tenure as dean.259
However, a change in the position of the Department of Defense prior to
her tenure as Dean required Harvard to revise its policy and allow the
military access through the placement office. 260 During Kagan's tenure as
Dean, the Third Circuit held that the Solomon Amendment was
unconstitutional. 261 At that time, Harvard reverted to the policy it used
during prior administrations, whereby students had access to military
recruiters through a campus veteran's group. 262 When the Department of
Defense made clear that it intended to appeal the Third Circuit's decision to
the Supreme Court, Harvard returned to the policy of allowing access to the
military through the placement office. 263 In addition, military recruiting at
Harvard actually increased during the period that the veteran's group
handled recruiting - a point that Kagan made during the hearing.264
The emphasis on Kagan's position on "don't ask/don't tell" led to
speculation among Christian and conservative political pundits regarding
Kagan's sexual orientation. 265 As Peter LaBarbera, President of Americans
255 id.
256 Id. at 76.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Kagan Hearing, supra note 244, at 71.
260 id
261 Id. at 72-73.
262 id.
263 Id. at 73.
264 id.
265 See, e.g., Americans for Truth about Homosexuality, If Elena Kagan is a Lesbian, She Should Say
So Because Public Has a Right to Know (May 10, 2010), http://americansfortruth.com/2010/05/10/if-
elena-kagan-is-a-lesbian-she-should-say-so-because-public-has-a-right-to-know/; Pray in Jesus' Name
Project, Is Elena Kagan a Lesbian? Media Ignores Four Harvard Students Outting Supreme Court
Nominee, CBS News Muzzled by White House, CHRISTIAN NEWS WIRE (May 10, 2010),
http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/8606913872.htm; Posting of Bryan Fischer, Is She or Isn't
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for Truth about Homosexuality, explained, "'Kagan has a strong pro-
homosexual record, including, as Harvard dean, fighting to keep military
recruiters off the campus because the military bars homosexuals.
Americans certainly have a right to know if her activism is driven by
deeply personal motivations that could undermine her fairness as a
judge."' 266 Thus, the leap was made from inferring Kagan's sexual
orientation based on her position on "don't ask/don't tell" and concomitant
sympathy for gays in the military, to Kagan being an unfair judge.
Interestingly, Justice Kagan's sexual orientation was first raised in the
media by conservative blogger Ben Domenech, who considered Kagan's
status as an openly gay woman a positive factor for purposes of her judicial
nomination.267 However, conservative Christian groups quickly picked up
on the speculation, demanding to know whether Kagan was a lesbian. 268
Some made the connection between her sexual orientation, her position on
"don/t ask/don't tell" and her potential decision making. 269 As the Christian
News Wire explains, "Kagan's private sex life already has, and will
directly impact her public Supreme Court decisions, especially on 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell,' and other issues."270
The Obama Administration fiercely denied the rumor that Kagan is a
lesbian.271 In fact, the only mainstream media source to report the story -
CBS news on-line - pulled the story, apparently at the insistence of the
Obama Administration. 272 Anita Dunn, who was working on the
nomination for the Obama Administration, stated that the network was
"'applying old stereotypes to single women with successful careers."'
273
While Dunn has a valid point, it is interesting that the Obama
Administration felt compelled to respond to the statements via an open
denial. This suggests that there is in fact something problematic with
nominating an openly lesbian candidate for a position on the United States
She? Let's Ask Her, RIGHTLYCONCERNED.COM (May 10, 2010, 8:24 AM),
http://www.afa.net/Blogs/BlogPost.aspx?id=2147494169.
266 Americans for Truth about Homosexuality, supra note 265.
267 Posting of Ben Domenech, Obama's Top Ten Supreme Court Picks (April 11, 2010)
http://newledger.com/2010/04/obamas-top-ten-supreme-court-picks/ ("Pluses: would please much of
Obama's base, follows diversity politics of Sotomayor with first openly gay justice"). Domenech later
updated his April 11th post by striking through the reference to Kagan's sexual orientation and
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her sexual orientation. Ben Domenech, The White House, Elena Kagan, and Me, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (April 16, 2010, 12:44 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-domenech/the-white-house-
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Supreme Court or any Article III appointment. Indeed, the first openly gay
Article III judicial candidate was just recently confirmed. 274
Leaving aside the controversy that rumors about Justice Kagan's sexual
orientation spawned, her hearings are still notable for the emphasis they
placed on her position against "don't ask/don't tell" and the approach
Harvard Law School took toward military recruiters. 275 Justice Kagan took
a position that happened to be in support LGBT individuals while
ultimately supporting Harvard's policy against discrimination and she paid
a price in the hearings for doing so. 276 Justice Kagan defied heterosexist
norms by opposing the military's position against openly gay and lesbian
persons in the military. While the Senators framed their argument as
"Kagan is anti-military," the only evidence supporting that was her position
on "don't ask/don't tell." The subtext is clear: taking a position against
"don't ask/don't tell" is the equivalent of being anti-military rather than
simply being anti-discrimination. The public commentary took it one step
farther - it made her a pro-gay lesbian who would vote in favor of LGBT
positions as a Justice. Because LGBT people are part of the United States
population, wouldn't an interest in diversity recommend a judicial
candidate who had an understanding of the position of these Americans?
VI. CONCLUSION
Sylvia Lazos Vargas has argued that partisan politics is largely to blame
for the difficulties diverse nominees face during the confirmation
process. 277 I believe that there is also something else going on in these
cases. The irony in the backlash raised about Justice Sotomayor's "wise
Latina woman" comment and decision in Ricci as well as Justice Kagan's
outspoken position on "don't ask/don't tell" presents sad commentary
about diversity in the judiciary. Looking at the reasons for supporting a
diverse bench - whether it be the diversity of perspectives of nontraditional
judges or the legitimacy a diverse bench brings to the justice system - it
becomes obvious that these two nominees were excellent diverse
candidates. Yet, it was in fact their diverse perspectives that caused them
difficulty in the confirmation process. Both identified with groups that have
less representation on the federal bench. And, of course, while the
diversity of these candidates' perspectives hindered them, Justice Alito's
perspective as an Italian American passed nearly unobserved.
274 See Horowitz, supra note 63.
275 See supra notes 245-70 and accompanying text.
276 See id.
277 See generally, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on
Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423 (2008) (discussing diversity in federal
judgeships and how the partisan nature of confirmation hearings ultimately hurts the ability to provide a
broad range of viewpoints on the bench).
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While the numbers of women and members of minority groups on the
federal bench lag behind their numbers in the general population, the attack
on these diverse candidates during the confirmation process could easily
discourage others of diverse backgrounds from pursuing a career on the
federal bench. Indeed, reading what are essentially attacks on the integrity
and impartiality of Justice Sotomayor during the confirmation process
certainly would discourage anyone who has publicly discussed their
backgrounds from engaging in that process. Likewise, the characterization
of Justice Kagan during the confirmation process as "anti-military" and the
public speculation as to her sexual orientation that ensued certainly might
discourage other similarly situated single accomplished women lawyers
from seeking a nomination.
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and public commentators
who attack such nontraditional candidates based on the diversity of
perspective they bring do a disservice to the process of judicial
confirmation and the goals of a diverse bench and ignore the supposition of
White male heterosexist norms that are presented as views of "neutrality."
As Justice Brennan explained, "[w]e are not an assimilative, homogeneous
society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to
abide by someone else's unfamiliar . .. practice because the same tolerant
impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies. . . . In a community such as ours,
'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform." 278
If one truly understands the importance of a diverse bench to the
judiciary's legitimacy, the irony in the vilification of nontraditional
candidates for being, well, "nontraditional," is obvious. Bringing persons of
differing perspectives to the bench strengthens the court system. It is
discouraging that the confirmation process likely undermines this goal.
21s Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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